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COMPARATIVE CAUSATION, INDEMNITY, AND THE
ALLOCATION OF LOSSES BETWEEN JOINT
TORTFEASORS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
TIMOTHY PATTON

The allocation of liability between defendants held jointly responsible
for a plaintiffs injury has long been a subject of voluminous commentary
and a source of confusion for courts and legislatures.' In recent years, this

confusion has intensified with the increasing emphasis on strict liability
as a ground for recovery in products liability cases. Loss distribution sys-

tems derived from common law indemnity theories and originally developed for use in negligence actions are poorly suited for use in strict liability
cases and frequently yield a disproportionate allocation of losses., In several jurisdictions, the search for an equitable method of allocating damages

between defendants, applicable to both strict liability and negligence, has
resulted simply in the modification of existing systems. In a few states,
however, the emergence of strict products liability has served as the impetus for the creation of a new system of loss distribution based'entirely on
"comparative causation."'
The Texas Supreme Court recently acknowledged the uncertainty that

exists in the Texas law of contribution and indemnity when one defendant
has been found negligent and another found strictly liable.' An analysis of

the present Texas system illustrates that the respective rights and liabilities of defendants in products liability cases are not readily ascertainable,
and emphasizes the need for a major revision of the Texas system of loss
allocation.
1. For comprehensive historical treatments of contribution and indemnity see Hodges,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 150 (1947); Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
2. See generally Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in
Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974); Phillips, Contribution and Indemnity
in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974).
3. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 901,146 Cal. Rptr. 182,
184 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972);
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977). See generally Davis,
Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution,and Equal Protection in the Trial and
Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10 IND. L. Rav. 831 (1976); Jensvold, A
Modem Approach to Loss Allocaton Among Tortfeasors in ProductsLiability Cases, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 723, 736-39 (1974).
4. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
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CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

GeneralBackground
At common law, contribution between joint tortfeasors' was denied to
the tortfeasor who had discharged the claim of the injured party.6 Underlying this rule was the policy of the law to leave wrongdoers where it finds
them, and to not allow one to base a right of recovery on his own wrong.'
Even at common law, however, a principal without personal fault, held
liable solely on the basis of respondeat superior, was entitled to indemnity
from his agent, the party actually at fault.' Gradually courts overcame the
common law disdain for contribution between wrongdoers and recognized
the injustice in a rule that allowed the entire loss, for which two defendants
were equally responsible, to fall on a single defendant.' The common law
doctrine has been abrogated by statute or judicial decision in most jurisdictions. "

For a full understanding of the allocation of losses between joint tortfeasors it is necessary that the terms "contribution" and "indemnity" be
properly differentiated. The terms are frequently confused and many cases
exist in which indemnity has been awarded in the name of contribution."
5. The term "joint tortfeasors" encompasses "all cases where there is joint liability for a
tort, whether the acts of those jointly liable were concerted, merely concurrent, or even
successive in point of time." Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 130, 132 n.9 (1932). See generally J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 26.02, at 539
(1977); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 692-97 (1956).
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 305 (4th ed. 1971); see Washington Gas Light Co. v. Landsden, 172 U.S. 534, 552 (1899); Oats v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex.
2, 11, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936); Longworth v. Stevens, 145 S.W. 257, 262 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1912, writ ref'd). This rule is ordinarily said to be derived from the
decision in Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 305 (4th ed. 1971).
7. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 305 (4th ed. 1971); Maynard
& Oldham, Indemnity and Contribution Between Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants
in Major Aircraft Litigation, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 245, 253 (1977).
8. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130,
146-48 (1932). See generally Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. CHI. L.
REv. 465 (1958). A party was also entitled to full reimbursement at common law when held
responsible solely by operation of law due to the acts of an independent contractor, business
partner, or on the basis of a non-delegable duty. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 51, at 311 (4th ad. 1971).
9. See Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 436, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949); Wheeler
v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345-46, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941).
10. Licenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. 1975). A majority of the states, the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have rejected the common law view and allow
contribution among tortfeasors. See id. at 390 n.1; Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case For
Unlimited Contribution,43 Miss. L.J. 50, 55 (1972).
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (awarding contribution in name of fifty percent indemnity).
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In indemnity, the entire loss is shifted from the tortfeasor who has been
compelled to pay, to another who should rightfully bear it."2 Contribution
signifies the payment by each tortfeasor of an equal or proportionate share
of the loss. 3 In addition to this distinction of total as opposed to partial
reimbursement, indemnity is said to be based upon an express or implied
contract while contribution is not based on contract but on equitable principles."
Texas was one of the first states to create a statutory exception to the
common law rule prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors, and
presently has two distinct contribution statutes.'" Designed to relieve the
harshness of the common law rule against contribution, these statutes are
applicable only when no right of common law indemnity exists.'" Grounds
for indemnity generally do not exist when joint tortfeasors are in pari
delicto, or equally at fault, with regard to the plaintiff's injury.'" Joint
tortfeasors will generally be held not to be in pari delicto when there is an
absence of concerted action, when the injury is caused by a breach of a
duty owed by one tortfeasor to the other, or when one tortfeasor has ac12. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); Strakos
v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 797-98 (Tex. 1962); Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435,
216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949). See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTtmON § 76 (1937); RErATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRrs § 886B, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
13. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 83 Tex. 509, 517, 18 S.W. 956, 959 (1892); accord, Herrero
v. Atkinson, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1964); White v. Johnson, 137 N.W.2d 674, 677
(Minn. 1965); Radford-Shelton v. St. Francis Hosp., 569 P.2d 506, 511 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
14. Symons v. Mueller Co., 526 F.2d 13, 16 (10th Cir. 1975); Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351
So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1977); see Brown & Root v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 261 (S.D.
Tex. 1950) (describing indemnity as derived from theory of unjust enrichment), aff'd, 198
F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1952).
15. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971) (contribution between tortfeasors); id. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (comparative negligence: contribution
among joint tortfeasors). The primary difference between the two statutes with regard to
loss distribution between tortfeasors is that article 2212 allocates loss on a pro rata basis
while article 2212a operates on a modified comparative fault basis. Compare TEx. Rav. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971) with id. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
16. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Tex. 1977) (article
2212a); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 529, 235 S.W.2d 609, 622-23 (1950) (article
2212). Article 2212 expressly provides that it is applicable only in the absence of grounds for
common law indemnity. See TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). Article 2212a
has no such provision but judicial treatment indicates that it will be subject to the same
qualification. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 55 S.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Tex. 1977).
17. See, e.g., Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 529, 235 S.W. 2d 609, 623 (1950);
Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Palestine Contractors v. Perkins, 375 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150, 153 (1947).
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tively participated in causing the injury and the other's liability arises
merely from acts of omission. 8
Texas Contribution Statutes
Although Texas has two contribution statutes, only one is applicable
when one or more defendants is found strictly liable.' The Texas Comparative Negligence Statute" speaks only of "negligence."', The contribution
statute, which allocates loss according to the number of tortfeasors, 2 is
expressly applicable to all torts and is the proper statute for use in strict
products liability situations. 3
The Texas Comparative Negligence Statute could easily be adapted, by
the addition of the words "strict liability," to cases in which one or more
defendants are found strictly liable. 2' The Texas Supreme Court has expressed concern over the feasibility of applying comparative negligence
principles when one party has been found negligent and another strictly
liable.2 Several jurisdictions, however, have successfully adapted the comparative system of distributing losses between joint tortfeasors to all prod18. Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345-46, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941).
19. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
20. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). Under the Texas
system of modified comparative negligence, a claimant may recover if he is found to be not
more than fifty percent at fault and his culpability is not greater than that of the other defendants. Id. See generally Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, ComparativeNegligence: An Exercise
in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655 (1974); Comment, Comparative Negligence in
Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 101 (1973).
21. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). See generally
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
22. Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971).

23. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977). See also Keeton,
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1978).
24. Several jurisdictions have dispensed with the necessity of amending statutes by
applying their comparative negligence statutes to products liability litigation despite language apparently limiting the statutes to negligence actions. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v.
Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 681-83 (D.N.H. 1972) (applying New
Hampshire law); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1967).
25. In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977), the court
stated that the comparative negligence statute "does not provide any mechanism for comparing the causative fault or percentage causation of a strictly liable manufacturer with the
negligent conduct of a negligent co-defendant." In the jurisdictions applying comparative
negligence to strict liability this argument has been regarded as being without substance. See
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976) (problem more
apparent than real); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
388 (1978) (jurors fully capable of comparing negligence with strict liability). The Alaska
Supreme Court also noted that comparative negligence has been applied without serious
difficulties in admiralty cases arising under the doctrine of seaworthiness, which is a form of
strict liability. See Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska
1978). See generally 36 LA. L. REV. 288 (1975).
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ucts liability cases." When strict liability is integrated into comparative

negligence, the trier of facts is vested with the responsibility of allocating
damages between negligent and strictly liable defendants." In order to
effectively compare the fault of a strictly liable tortfeasor with that of a
negligent tortfeasor, some courts have treated strict liability as negligence

per se.28 The majority of jurisdictions applying comparative negligence to
situations involving strictly liable tortfeasors, however, do not label strict
liability as negligence per se," but instead reason that a violation of a duty
owed, regardless of its characterization as strict liability or negligence,

constitutes culpable conduct and is capable of apportionment by the fact
finder.3
26. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D.
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 68183 (D. N.H. 1972) (applying New Hampshire law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 43 (Alaska 1976); Daly' v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1164,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89-90 (Fla.
1976); Busch v. Busch Const. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977); Dippel v. Sciano, 155
N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1967). Other courts have specifically rejected the application of comparative negligence to products liability. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir.
1976) (applying Nebraska law); Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
See generally Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 723 (1974); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797 (1977); Note, Products Liability,
ComparativeNegligence, and ihe Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 73 (1976). Even in jurisdictions allocating on a pro rata basis several courts have
denied a strictly liable defendant a right to contribution from a negligent codefendant. See
Fenton v. McCory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260, 262 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (contribution right exists only
between negligent tortfeasors); Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 254 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1969) (public policy demands shifting burden to manufacturer even to extent of
ignoring codefendant's negligence). Contra, Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31,
34 (3d Cir. 1973); Walters v. HIAB Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
27. Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976); Daly
v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978). Criticism of the
application of comparative negligence to strict liability focuses on the lack of an exact mechanism for an equitable allocation of damages between negligent and strictly liable defendants.
See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977). No jurisdiction has
as yet developed a system more precise than one that merely vests the fact finder with
responsibility for allocation. This problem could be remedied, to a great extent, by an appellate court requirement that juries and trial judges clearly state the factual bases of the
apportionment. See V. SCHWARTZ. COMPARATIVE NzauaaErc § 17.1, at 110 (Supp. 1978).
28. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Dippel v. Sciano,
155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (Wis. 1967).
29. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIE NEGLGENCE § 12.6, at 205 (1974) (criticizing negli-

gence per se theory as an attempt to force strict liability into negligence terminology).
30. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602 (D. Idaho
1976); accord, Butuad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978).
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COMPARATIVE CAUSATION

An emerging concept in the allocation of losses between joint tortfeasors
involves the abandonment of common law indemnity principles and the
assessment of liability solely on the basis of actual responsibility for the
plaintiff's injury.' This doctrine may be distinguished from most compartive negligence statutes in that a defendant has a right of contribution from
codefendants for the portion of the judgment paid in excess of actual
culpability even if his own culpability is equal to or greater than the culpability of his codefendants. 3 Although this system has received diverse labels" in the few jurisdictions in which it is used, several basic theories
underlie its development." The concept primarily evolved from dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing characteristics of common law indemnity."
31. At least four states by judicial action have adopted comparative causation as a
method of allocating liability. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899,
901,146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1978); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn.
1977); Dole v. Dow Chem Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972); Bielski
v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1962). Those jurisdictions which have included optional subsection 2(4) in their adoption of the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act also employ this method of distributing losses. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1002(4) (1962); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 663-12 (1955);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15 (1967). Optional subsection 2(4) provides "[w]hen there
is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal
distribution among them of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault
of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares." UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2(4) (revised 1955). The 1955 version of the Act
omitted subsection 2(4) and determined liability on a pro rata basis without considering
relative degrees of fault. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr § 2. There is also
language in several state court decisions that indicates this doctrine would be adopted under
the proper circumstances. See Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 358 N.E.2d 317, 32223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 354 A.2d 685, 690 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1976); Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 576 P.2d 388, 392
(Wash. 1978).
32. See generallyV. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § § 3.1-3.5 (1974) (Supp. 1978).
33. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Alaska 1978) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (comparative causation); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct.,
578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1978) (equitable indemnity); Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972) (partial indemnification). See also
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723, 739 (1974) (comparative responsibility).
34. See 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY Indemnity § 44.02[21, at 1513 (1978); Davis, ComparativeNegligence, ComparativeContribution,and Equal Protection
in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10 IND. L. REv. 831, 83132 n.4 (1977); Comment, Relative ContributionAmong Tortfeasors: Time for JudicialChange
of the Washington Rule?, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 179, 183-84 (1975); Comment, ComparativeFault
and Strict Products Liability: Are They Compatible?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 501, 514-16
(1978).
35. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 185 (1978); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 354 A.2d 685, 690 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1976); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386
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Frequently, one tortfeasor may have a technical right of indemnity as
against another. The entire loss is thereby shifted to and imposed upon one
party and the other is completely relieved of responsibility, without regard
for the fact that in a given situation, the actual proportion of causal responsibility for the plaintiff's injury may not be 100 to zero percent.3 In addition, the numerous tests for common law indemnity have frequently been
criticized as resting on artificial distinctions and as "lacking the objective
criteria desirable for predictability in the law." 37 Thus, concluding that the
all-or-nothing concept of indemnity does not produce an equitable allocation of loss, a few courts have used a doctrine that permits a joint tortfeasor
to obtain "partial indemnity" from other joint tortfeasors on a comparative
fault basis without regard to the presence or absence of grounds for common law indemnity. Under this theory, in one sense, indemnity does
remain in effect. Rather than being determined by the technical criteria
of the numerous common law indemnity tests, full reimbursement occurs
when one defendant with zero responsibility is entitled to shift 100 percent
of the judgment to a party who is found 100 percent responsible.3
Recovery based on the respective parties' comparative causation is not
(1972). Criticism of the drastic aspects of implied indemnity frequently compares them to
the inequitable effects a plaintiff's contributory negligence has on his cause of action in
jurisdictions still recognizing such conduct as defense to liability. See American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1978); Tolbert v. Gerber
Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
32 Sw. L. J. 1, 13 (1978); Note, Products Liability, ComparativeNegligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S.CAL. L. REy. 73 (1976).
36. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 185 (1978); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977); Bielski v.
Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Wis. 1962). See generally Goldenberg & Nicholas,
Comparative Liability Among Joint Tortfeasors: the Aftermath of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 8
U.W.L.A. L. REV. 23, 34 (1976); Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among
Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 736-39 (1974); Phillips,
Contribution and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85, 121 (1974).
37. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Franco, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (Ct. App. 1968); accord,
Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977) (describing indemnity as
blunt instrument in allocating responsibility for damages); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282
N.E.2d 288, 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 388 (1972) (stating indemnity doctrine evolved in unnatural surroundings of inflexible common law rules). See generally Davis, Indemnity Between
Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REv. 517, 539-44 (1952); Jensvold,
A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58
MINN. L. REv. 723, 736-38 (1974); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors,
41 S. CAL. L. REv.728, 737-43 (1968).
38. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 901, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 185 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 39192 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105,107 (Wis. 1962). See also UNIFORM COMPARATIVE
FAULT AcT § 2.
39. See Langsford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 513 F.2d 1121, 1127 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying
New York law) (auto dealer whose fault was minimal indemnified by manufacturer who was
100 percent responsible); 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY Indemnity §
44.02[4], at 15-43 (1978).
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totally foreign to Texas law. In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins'" the
Texas Supreme Court used the doctrine of comparative causation to determine the recovery of an injured plaintiff who unforeseeably misused" a
defective product."2 The court did not base its holding on the comparative
negligence statute but rather on a form of pure comparative causation
under which the plaintiff's recovery was diminished by the percentage of
responsibility for his own injury as determined by the trier of facts.'"
COMMON LAW INDEMNITY

In a wide variety of situations courts will consider it proper to shift the
entire burden of loss from one tortfeasor to another. Attempting to encompass all possible circumstances, different jurisdictions employ a myriad of
tests for common law indemnity." Under the active-passive test one whose

liability is predicated on nonfeasance is gntitled to full reimbursement
from one who actively caused the injury." Although this test is regarded

as unsound by Texas courts," it serves as the primary criteria for determin-

ing products liability indemnity in several jurisdictions. 7 The primarysecondary test is used in several states and awards indemnity to a tortfeasor who was under only a secondary duty when another was primarily
40. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
41. Unforeseeable misuse will bar or reduce a plaintiff's recovery in a strict liability
action. Id. at 351; accord, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, 384 (1978); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments g, h (1965). See generally Noel, Defective
Products: Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv.
93, 95-105 (1972).
42. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977). See generally
Blanton, The Nature of Damages in Personal Injury Actions as Viewed by a Trial Judge, 18
S. TEX. L.J. 157, 161 (1977); 14 Hous. L. REv. 1115 (1977).
43. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
44. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 311-12 (4th ed.
1971); Maynard & Oldham, Indemnity and ContributionBetween Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants in Major Aircraft Litigation, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 245, 253 (1977).
45. Oats v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 11, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936). The activepassive rule is generally applied in situations in which one tortfeasor has created the danger
and another has merely failed to discover or remedy the situation. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK
OP THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 312 (4th ed. 1971). See generally 1 J. DooLEY, MODERN Tom
LAW § 26.07, at 547-48 (1977).
46. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. 1977). There appears
to be a growing dissatisfaction with the active-passive test and it has been expressly rejected
in several states. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., 309 N.E.2d 104, 108 (I11.App. Ct.
1974); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. 1977); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transport Corp., 202 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Wis. 1972).
47. See, e.g., Symons v. Mueller Co., 526 F.2d 13, 19 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Kansas
law); Hart Properties, Inc. v. Eastern Elevator Serv. Corp., 357 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Smith Radio Communications, Inc. v. Challenger Equip., 527 P.2d 711, 713
(Or. 1974).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/9

8

Patton: Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses be

19791

COMMENTS

responsible.'8 It also has been said that indemnity will only be permitted
when there exists a great difference in the gravity of the fault between
tortfeasors, or when there is a gross disparity in the nature of the duties
owed by the wrongdoer to the injured party."
In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons0 the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that there were several approaches to indemnification, but
because of the variety of duties and situations it was impossible to state a
single, all-inclusive test.5' Texas courts use four theories which vary in the
ease of their application and the equity of their results. 5 First, as a general
rule, indemnity will lie in favor of a tortfeasor who is only vicariously
liable. 3 A second test, derived from the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Wheeler v. Glazer,51 determines the existence of grounds for common law
indemnity on the basis of the ,difference in the nature of duties owed by
the joint tortfeasors to the aggrieved party.5 The third test turns upon the
existence of a breach of duty between tortfeasors5 6 When an injury, forming the basis for a judgment against joint tortfeasors, results from a viola48. See, e.g., Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Franco, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1968);
Keefer v. Al Johnson Const. Co., 193 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1971); Hendricks v. Leslie Fay,
Inc., 159 S.E.2d 362, 365 (N.C. 1968).
49. See, e.g., Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 915 (1952); Rollins v. State, 92 Cal. Rptr. 251, 254 (Ct. App. 1971); Russell v.
Community Hosp. Ass'n, 428 P.2d 783, 788 (Kan. 1967).
50. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
51. Id. at 859-60.
52. See id. at 859-62.
53. See Oats v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 10-11, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829 (1936) (agent
received full reimbursement when subjected to liability by principal); City of San Antonio
v. Talerico, 98 Tex. 151, 155, 81 S.W. 518, 520 (1904) (municipality, held strictly liable for
failure to keep highways in safe condition, indemnified by person creating dangerous condition); South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 948 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer entitled to shift loss to employee actually
responsible for plaintiff's injury); Westheimer Transfer & Storage Co. v. Houston Bldg. Co.,
198 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, writ refd n.r.e.) (defendant liable
solely on basis of nondelegable duty indemnified by negligent independent contractor);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF RESTiTUTION §§ 87, 95-96
(1937). See generally 2 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.6(c), at 412-14 (1978); W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 311 (4th ed. 1971); Hodges, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REV. 150, 153-55 (1947).
54. 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
55. Id. at 345-46, 153 S.W.2d at 451-52 (carrier, held liable to injured passenger for failure
to exercise high degree of care, indemnified by negligent driver who breached duty of ordinary
care to injured party); accord, Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 263 (S.D.
Tex. 1950) (leaving open culvert with flimsy barricade and no lights more culpable than
driving at excessive speed), aff'd, 198 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1952); Panhandle Gravel Co., Inc. v.
Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ refd n.r.e.) (speeding by
driver of improperly loaded truck more culpable than improper loading by gravel company);
Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Mayo, 180 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944, writ
ref'd w.o.m.) (applying test to bus-truck collision and finding parties to be in pari delicto).
56. See Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 529, 235 S.W.2d 609, 623 (1950).
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tion of a duty which one of the tortfeasors owed the other, the latter, at
common law, is entitled to indemnity from the other.57
The test that determines the existence of grounds for indemnity on the
basis of vicarious liability is still employed by Texas courts." The remaining two tests, however, have merged into and serve as the foundation for
the fourth and primary test for common law indemnity in Texas.59 Used
in products liability to the exclusion of the other three methods, 0 this test
was first stated in Austin Road Co. v. Pope:"'
In order to determine whether the loss should be shifted from one tortfeasor
to another the proper approach is to consider the one seeking indemnity' as
though he were a plaintiff suing the other in tort, and then determine whether
such a one as plaintiff, though guilty of a wrong against 2a third person, is
nevertheless entitled to recovery against his co-tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule is that in most indemnity cases one tortfeasor
has breached a duty he owed to both his cotortfeasor and the injured
plaintiff. Although both are liable to the plaintiff, as between tortfeasors
the blameless should be allowed indemnity.6
Proper use of this test is illustrated by Austin Road Co. v. Evans.' In
this case two motorists sued a road company and a third motorist for
damages arising from rear end collisions that resulted when the road company negligently created a dense dust cloud. Both the third motorist, by
following too closely, and the road company, by creating the dust cloud,
breached duties to the plaintiffs." While the creation of the road hazard
was also a breach of duty to the third motorist," the negligent driving by
the third motorist did not constitute a breach of duty to the road com57. Id. at 529, 235 S.W.2d at 623; accord, Tobin & Rooney Plastering Co. v. Giles, 418
S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ); Gammage v. Weinberg, 355
S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ rerd n.r.e.).
58. See South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 948 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
59. See generally General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-61 (Tex. 1977);
Comment, Contributionand Indemnity: Does the Right Exist Among Joint Tort!easors When
One is Liable on a Theory of Strict Liability?, 18 S. Tax. L.J. 572, 574-76 (1977).
60. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Tex. 1977);
United Tractor, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 563 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978,
no writ); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd
n.r.e.).
61. 147 Tex. 430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949). See also Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity
Among Tortfeasors, 26 TExAs L. REv. 150, 162 (1947).
62. Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949).
63. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); Austin Road
Co. v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150, 162 (1947).
64. 499 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. See id. at 197.
66. Id. at 200.
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pany.11 Therefore, the negligent motorist and the road company were not
in pari delicto and the motorist was entitled to have ultimate liability
imposed on her cotortfeasor.18
The relative duty, Texas test undoubtedly furnished a more predictable
and exact system than the active-passive or primary-secondary tests." Its
application when relative duties are clear-cut also avoids the procedural
complexities of methods that allocate losses on the basis of comparative
fault.70 Unfortunately certain equitable considerations are sacrificed in the
achievement of consistent holdings. As the emphasis of this Texas test is
on the relative duties between tortfeasors,' it thereby overlooks the primary purpose of indemnity, namely the fair allocation of losses." The
attainment of this equitable goal is more likely if the attention of the court
.is focused on each party's actual responsibility for the plaintiffs injury
rather than on an attempt to discern the existence and breach of duties
between joint tortfeasors.1"
Amply illustrating the inherent unfairness of the Texas system are products liability cases in which a seller, who has negligently contributed to an
injury to a consumer, is entitled to full indemnification from a manufacturer who breached a duty to the seller by supplying a defective product. ',
Although the seller was partially responsible for the injury, when he
67. Id. at 200.
68. Id. at 200.
69. See Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors:A ProposedRationale, 37 IOWA
L. REV. 517, 545 (1952). Both the active-passive and primary-secondary tests have been
criticized for promulgating inconsistent decisions. See generally Michael & Appel,
Contributionand Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Need for Reform, 7 Loy.
CI. L.J. 591, 595-97 (1976); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41
S. CAL. L. REv. 728, 738-39 (1968); Note, ProductsLiability, Comparative Negligence, and
the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 73, 82 (1976).
70. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 909, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 192 (1978); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 313-14 (4th ed. 1971);
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723, 736-38 (1974).
71. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Tex. 1977);
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1963); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d
787, 797-98 (Tex. 1962). See also Comment, Contribution and Indemnity: Does the Right
Exist Among Joint Tortfeasors When One is Liable on a Theory of Strict Liability?, 18 S.
TEx. L.J. 572, 576 (1977).
72. See 3A L. FRUMER & M.. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABLITY Indemnity § 44.04 [2], at
15-19 (1978); Allen, Joint Tortfeasors-A Case for Unlimited Contribution,43 Miss. L.J. 50,
55 (1972); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,21 CORN. L. Q. 552, 554
(1936). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
73. See Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors:A ProposedRationale, 37 IOWA
L. REV. 517, 546 (1952); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 728, 737-43 (1968). "Regardless of the terminology used, the crucial question is
whether it would be fair to require a party, because of greater fault, to compensate another
who has been subjected-to liability." 1 J. DOOLEV, MODERN TORT LAW § 26.07, at 549 (1977).
74. See Richard Mfg. Co. v. Aspromonte, 557 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
lIst Dist.1 1977, no writ).
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breached no duty to the manufacturer he incurred no liability.75 Under a
rule which allocates losses on the basis of comparative causation, the presence or absence of duties between tortfeasors would never be an issue and
liability would be apportioned on the basis of actual responsibility for the
plaintiff's injury."
ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY SITUATIONS

Employer/Purchaserv. Manufacturer
In most instances this situation involves a defective product purchased
from a manufacturer and an injury to an invitee or employee of the purchaser that was received while using the product in a foreseeable manner."
The purchaser's liability to the injured party is generally predicated on the
purchaser's failure to inspect, or on a nondelegable duty to provide reasonably safe tools or a reasonably safe place to work. Texas cases in this area
have allowed indemnity to a purchaser unless his intervening acts of negligence bar recovery against the manufacturer." Employers held liable for
the death of, or injuries suffered by an employee have been entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer when they unknowingly supplied a
workshop with defective wiring,"9 a railroad car with a defective handbrake," or an elevator with a defective gear. 8 Underlying these holdings is
75. Id. at 552. See also Note, Products Liability, ComparativeNegligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 73, 91 (1976).
76. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972)
(manufacturer entitled to contribution from negligent employer despite lack of duty running
from employer to manufacturer). See also Note, ProductsLiability, ComparativeNegligence,
and the Allocation of DamagesAmong Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 73, 92 (1976).
77. 3A L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY Indemnity § 44.02 [3][a], at 1520 to 15-23 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 430 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1013 (1969); South
Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Pigott, 116 S.W. 841,847 (Tex. Civ. App.-1909,
writ ref'd). Results in other jurisdictions are in accord with Texas decisions regardless of the
test applied. See, e.g., Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 390 F.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir.) (activepassive test) (shipowner indemnified by manufacturer when longshoreman hurt by defective
packaging of doors), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. "Quick-Way"
Truck Shovel Co., 204 F. Supp. 847, 853 (D. Colo. 1962) (primary-secondary test) (wrong
type bolts for crane in need of repair supplied by manufacturer who indemnified purchaser),
aff'd, 314 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1963); Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Co., 189 NE.2d
645, 649 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (primary-secondary test) (seller of hydraulic lift required to
indemnify service station owner for employee's judgment against owner).
79. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Pigott, 116 S.W. 841, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-1909, writ
ref'd).
80. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 430 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1013 (1969). See
also Pullman Co. v. Norton, 91 S.W. 841, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-1905, writ rerd) (sleeping car
company supplying defective car indemnified railway company for liability to injured passenger); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 93c (1937).
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the premise that while the employer breached a duty to his employee, the
manufacturer breached a duty to both the injured party and to the employer/purchaser to whom he supplied the defective item.2
In this illustrative situation and those that follow, it must be emphasized that the failure of a purchaser to inspect or test a product does not
constitute a breach of duty to the manufacturer." Some jurisdictions have
modified the duty to inspect, but in Texas a purchaser's right to indemnity
is not affected by his failure to inspect." Despite the normal rule allowing
indemnity, intervening acts of negligence can act as a bar to recovery
against the manufacturer." Older cases refused indemnity in such instances on the ground that awareness of the defect or aggravation thereof
changed a purchaser's status from a passive to an active tortfeasor 6
Manufacturer v. Employer/Purchaser
With the advent of workers' compensation laws, the effect of an employer's negligent actions on his liability to a manufacturer or his right to
indemnity from a manufacturer has become unclear. Since workers' compensation laws confer immunity on employers from employee tort action
for work-related injuries, employers are not jointly liable with the manufacturer of a defective product for an injury to an employee partially
caused by an employer's negligence." The vast majority of jurisdictions bar
81. Otis Elevator Co. v. Cameron, 205 S.W. 852, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ
ref'd). See also Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. 1968) (indemnity
principles not discussed but elevator purchaser absolved of liability).
82. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 430 S.W.2d 900, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston (14th Dist.) 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1013 (1969).
83. Champion Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Nass, 94 Tex. 255, 257, 59 S.W.
870, 871 (1900) (employer/purchaser negligently inspecting railroad car not entitled to indemnity as held contributorily negligent).
84. Otis Elevator Co. v. Cimeron, 205 S.W. 852, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ
ref'd) (employer indemnified by manufacturer despite failure to inspect and discover structural defect); accord, Roberts v. Richland Mfg. Co., 260 F. Supp. 274, 277 (W.D. Mich. 1966)
(no duty to discover latent defects); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. "Quick-Way" Truck Shovel Co.,
204 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D. Colo. 1962) (failure to discover faulty bolts did not bar indemnity),
aff'd, 314 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1963). See also RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrtmoN § 93, Comment a
(1937).
85. See 3A L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY Indemnity § 44.04, at 15-54
to 15-55 (1977). See generally Scarzafava, An Analysis of ProductsLiability Defenses in the
Aftermath of Hopkins, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 261 (1977).
86. See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Nass, 95 Tex. 255, 257, 59 S.W. 870, 871 (1900)
(employer's failure to inspect constituted active negligence). Jurisdictions still employing
the active-passive test also refuse indemnity on the grounds that the employer's negligence
has been transformed from passive to active. See Oregon Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. E.L.
Caldwell & Sons, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Ore. 1969) (employer who was aware of defect
and who permitted employee to use product actively negligent); Goldstein v. Compudyne
Corp., 45 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (employer's continued use of machine despite
known defect was active negligence).
87. See TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon 1967). See generally 2A A.
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a third party's claim for indemnification when based upon the employer's
liability to the employee.88
Courts that allocate loss on the basis of the joint tortfeasors' relative
duties refuse manufacturers' indemnity claims regardless of an employer's
actual responsibility for an injury.8 ' Indemnification is denied because no
duty is owed to the manufacturer by the employer to exercise due care with
respect to the manufacturer's product." Although this method of allocation allows negligent employers to escape liability, Texas courts would
probably follow the majority rule and refuse indemnity since the Texas
indemnity test centers on the existence of duties rather than on actual
culpability.
Jurisdictions apportioning loss strictly on the basis of comparative causation hold an employer liable to the extent that his conduct contributed
to the employee's injury." As the injured employee's total recovery is not
affected by a complete or partial shifting of the burden from the manufacturer to the employer, equitable considerations would seem to require the
allocation of loss on a comparative causation basis.2
Retailer v. Manufacturer
Sales of food or drugs in violation of a statute may create a cause of
action for a consumer regardless of the retailer's fault. 3 In Griggs Canning
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 76.00, at 14-287 to 14-407 (1976).

88. Maynard & Oldham, Indemnity and ContributionBetween Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants in Major Aircraft Litigation,43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 245, 256 (1977).
89. See Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (fact that employer secondarily negligent in fall of employee into vat of
cooking oil immaterial to manufacturer's indemnity claim); William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco'
Woodwork, Inc., 348 A.2d 716, 718 (N.H. 1975) (employer's negligence in allowing employee
to use band saw without guard had no bearing on manufacturer's indemnity claim).
90. William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 348 A,2d 716, 718 (N.H. 1975);
Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 378 A.2d 53, 63-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); Olch v.
Pacific Press & Shear Co., 573 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). See also Larson,
Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 N.W.U. L.
REV. 351, 419 (1970). Some courts hold that the relationship between a manufacturer and
an employer/purchaser is a sufficient basis for a claim for indemnity. See Ham v. Standard
Eng'r Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (D.S.D. 1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Kaiser Gypsum Co., 539 P.2d 1065, 1073 (Or. 1975). See generally Comment, Another Look
at Strict Liability: The Effect on ContributionAmong Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REv. 125, 132
(1974); Note, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special
Defense Against Action by the Injured Party, 51 CORN. L.Q. 407 (1967).
91. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Il1.
1977); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972).
92. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ill. 1977);
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972). See also 2A A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.44 (1976).
93. See Texas Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-5
(Vernon 1976). Section 402A was originally proposed to cover food and drugs only. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973).
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Co. v. Josey" a grocery store owner who was held strictly liable for breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption was entitled to
full reimbursement from the processor. 5 Again, the Texas rationale for
such holdings is that although the retailer is strictly liable to the injured
consumer, the retailer is without fault to the food supplier, who in turn has
breached a duty to both the injured consumer and the retailer. 9
In most instances in Which a retailer has been held strictly liable for
injuries to the ultimate consumer caused by a defective product manufactured by another, the retailer was entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer when he neither knew of nor contributed to the dangerous defect. 7
Thus, in a retailer's action arising out of a consumer's suit against the
manufacturer and retailer of a mobile home for injuries suffered in a fire
caused by a latent defect in the electrical system, the retailer had no
obligation to the manufacturer to repair latent defects and received indemnity."
For a retailer to recover in an indemnity action against a manufacturer
it is essential to the retailer's cause of action that the evidence affirmatively prove that the product was in a defective condition when it left the
hands of the manufacturer." If the evidence neither circumstantially nor
94. 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
95. Id. at 634, 164 S.W.2d at 840; accord, Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 867 (D.C.
Cir. 1936); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 705 (N.J. 1969) (seller of caustic permanent wave solution has cause of action against manufacturer); Di Gregorio v. Champlain
Valley Fruit Co., 255 A.2d 183, 185 (Vt. 1969) (failure to discover thermometer in banana did
not bar retailer's indemnification by supplier). But cf. Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 24
N.E.2d 131, 133 (N.Y. 1939) (restauranteur not entitled to indemnity from seller of bad pork
when cooked insufficiently).
96. See generally Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 435, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949).
Another court employed similar reasoning, holding that a supplier of inedible food breached
a duty to both the restauranteur and to the customer. Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear
Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
97. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. 1977); accord,
Jennings v. United States, 374 F.2d 983, 987 n.7 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying Maryland law);
Allison Steel Mfg. Co. v. Superior Ct., 511 P.2d 198, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Good v. A.B.
Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217, 227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
886B(2), Comment g at 9-10 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). See generally 3A L. FRUMER & M.
FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY Indemnity § 44.04[4], at 15-54 to 15-55 (1977); Davis,
Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L.J. 517, 526-27
(1952). Underlying the imposition of ultimate liability on the manufacturer is the theory that
losses "should be borne by those who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing
the product in the stream of commerce." Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186
(III. 1965).
98. Champion Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237, 243-44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Valore, Product Liability for a Defective
House, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 319 (1969). Joint liability predicated solely on the failure of a
packager to include a proper warning will also warrant indemnification of a retailer. See
Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.1
1971) (exploding can of refrigerant), rev'd on other grounds, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
99. Compare Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W,2d 118, 125 (Tex. Civ.
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directly establishes the existence of a defect in the product at the time of
sale, the retailer will remain the sole party liable to the injured consumer.M
A frequent source of litigation in this area emanates from an injury to a
purchaser caused by a defective automobile with the dealer and manufacturer joined as defendants."0 ' When the dealer merely serves as an innocent
conduit for a defective machine, he will experience little difficulty in shifting the entire loss to the manufacturer.0 2 If an automobile manufacturer,
however, sells a dealer a vehicle with defectively designed parts and the
dealer knowingly aggravates and contributes to the condition, severely
enhancing the danger, the parties will be considered to be in pari delicto
and a claim for indemnity will be denied. 13 Underlying this denial of
indemnity is the reasoning that the manufacturer breached its duty to the
dealer by supplying a defective automobile but the dealer's installation
with actual knowledge of the danger and the probable consequences constituted a similar breach of duty to the manufacturer. 0'
The scarcity of Texas cases dealing with this aspect of indemnity law
makes it somewhat uncertain at what point a dealer's contribution will be
0 5
sufficient to constitute a breach of duty to the automobile manufacturer.'
The failure to discover a latent mechanical or structural defect will not
incur liability. 06 A dealer will be considered to have breached a duty to a
App.-Houston [14th Dist.I 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (no indemnity when retailer failed to
trace defect back to bottler) with Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 277, 183
S.W.2d 968, 970 (1944) (recovery allowed when consumer sufficiently traced defect in bottle
back to manufacturer). See also Herbert v. Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no indemnity where restauranteur failed to establish
ice was impure when delivered by ice manufacturer).
100. See Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The injured consumer's cause of action
is also predicated on proving that the product was in a defective condition when purchased
by the consumer. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965).
101. See generally Sales & Purdue, The Law of Strict Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 1, 100 (1977).
102. Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.I 1971, no writ) (dicta); accord, Langford v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 373 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (using comparative fault test), aff'd, 513 F.2d
1121 (2d Cir. 1975).
103. Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). In Russell & Smith the court's determination
that Russell & Smith had knowingly aggravated the defect was based on a finding that
although vans equipped with air conditioners had chronic overheating problems, the dealership continued to install that equipment. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 562-63.
105. See generally Comment, The Automobile Manufacturer as Guarantor of His
Product, 11 GONz. L. REv. 221, 239-40 (1975); Comment, Are There Implied Warranties on
Used Cars in California?,9 U.S.F. L. REv. 539, 540-43 (1975).
106. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 501 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
list Dist.1 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (dealer's indemnity award against manufacturer affirmed
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manufacturer, however, when he has actual knowledge of a dangerous
defect regardless whether that knowledge, was acquired independently or
directly from the manufacturer.' 1
0
The California Supreme Court in its adoption of equitable indemnity
singled out the automobile manufacturer-dealer situation as indicative of
the inequitable results achieved by the application of rigid standards for
common law indemnity.' In Ford Motor Co. v. Poeschl, Inc. Ford had
sent a recall notice to one of its dealers who failed to recall the defective
car and, as a result, a consumer suffered a severe injury. Although the
dealer's omission was a major factor in the consumer's injury, the court of
appeals reluctantly charged Ford with total liability because loss allocation in California was governed by several inflexible indemnity tests."10
Under the newly announced California system of equitable indemnity,
however, that case would be decided on a comparative causation basis and
the inequitable result of permitting the dealer to escape all liability would
be avoided."'
despite dealer's failure to discover design defects); accord, Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 494
S.W.2d 678, 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weeks-Allen Motor Co.,
198 S.E.2d 88, 91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). But cf. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Licht, 544
S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) (retailer not entitled to indemnity
when consumer's cause of action based on consumer protection statute). See also Champion
Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (no duty to discover latent defects in mobile home).
107. See Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 559-60 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). In jurisdictions using active-passive or primary.
secondary tests as opposed to the Texas concept of relative duties between joint tortfeasors,
dealers incur liability if they are aware of or aggravate the defect. See Duckworth v. Ford
Motor Co., 320 F.2d 130, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1963) (manufacturer entitled to contribution from
dealer who negligently failed to repair steering assembly); Chapman v. General Motors Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 94, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (dealer liable to manufacturer for contribution or indemnity if his carelessness was factor in collision).
108. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 901-02, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182,
184-85 (1978).
109. Id. at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193. See generally Note, ProductsLiability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 73, 93 (1976).
110. Ford Motor Co. v. Poeschl, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 702-705 (Ct. App. 1971). See also
Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (despite violation of
agreement to inspect all new cars, dealer entitled to indemnity from manufacturer as negligence was merely passive).
111. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899,910-11,146 Cal. Rptr. 182,
193-94 (1978). The California Supreme Court emphasized that the drastic characteristics of
implied indemnity are incompatible with the equitable allocation of losses stating:
The all-or-nothing aspect of the doctrine has precluded courts from reaching a just
solution in the great majority of cases in which equity and fairness call for an apportionment of loss between the wrongdoers in proportion to their relative culpability,
rather than the imposition of the entire loss upon one or the other tortfeasor.
Id. at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
Just distribution of liability may also be obtained in an automobile manufacturer/dealer
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Manufacturer v. Retailer
When a manufacturer sells a retailer a defective product that injures the
ultimate buyer, the manufacturer is held strictly liable and thus has no
ground for an indemnity claim and receives contribution only when he has
been the victim of a significant breach of duty by the retailer."' Strict
liability is a vehicle of social policy as it looks to the protection of the
public,"' and courts will not allow it to be undermined by attempts to shift
the risks of a defective product to an innocent retailer."'
Two civil appeals cases and a Fifth Circuit case provide guidelines for
the rights and liabilities involved in indemnity claims between manufacturers and retailers. In Richard Manufacturing Co. v. Aspromonte"' the
plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer, Richards, and the
seller, Sears Roebuck & Co., for eye and face injuries sustained when the
battery of another car exploded during an attempt to jump-start the plaintiff's car."' Both Sears and Richards were found guilty of negligence in
failing to give adequate warnings and cautionary instructions regarding the
use of jumper cables." 7 Richards contended that since it manufactured
cables to Sears' specifications, Sears breached a duty owed to Richards to
specify that appropriate warnings be placed on the battery cables."' Refusing Richards' claim for indemnity the court of civil appeals stated that
Sears owed no such duty and further held that as Richards had breached
its duty to Sears by furnishing a defective product, Sears was entitled to
context when allocation is based upon a comparative fault statute. See Burks Motors, Inc.
v. International Harvester Co., 466 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Ark. 1971) (dealer found ten percent
negligent received ninety percent contribution from manufacturer). See generally Phillips,
Contribution and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REv. 85, 104-07 (1974).
112. See Frisch v. International Harvester Co., 338 N.E.2d 90, 102 (III. App. Ct. 1975)
(indemnity allowed when distributor's negligent failure to warn viewed merely as continuation of defect); cf. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 809, 814 (Ct. App. 1971)
(tire dealer liable to manufacturer for indemnity when he failed to advise consumer of
dangers of over-inflation).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965) states in pertinent part:
"[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products ...
be placed upon those who market them .
and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection ...
Accord, K & S Oil Well Serv., Inc. v. Cabot
Corp. 491 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (products
liability based on public policy considerations).
114 See Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 1972). When a retailer is
under a statutory or contractual obligation to equip the product with safety devices he may
incur liability for contribution if he fails to fulfill that obligation. See Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law) (manufacturer of
defective grinding wheel and employer who failed to install guard required by law in pari
delicto).
115. 557 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
116. Id. at 550.
117. Id. at 551.
118. Id. at 551.
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full indemnification.It

In Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales2" the plaintiff sought recovery against a
drug manufacturer for drug induced deafness. The manufacturer, BristolMeyers, was found strictly liable to the patient for failure to provide adequate information on the use of the drug and the prescribing and treating
physician was determined to be negligent for administering the drug in
excessive dosages and for failing to halt treatment when symptoms indicated an adverse reaction.' The jury also found that Bristol-Meyers had
failed to give the doctor adequate warnings and that the doctor reasonably
relied on the inadequate instructions.' The manufacturer sought indemnity or contribution from the physician who had settled with the plaintiff
prior to trial.' In response, the physician sought indemnity or contribution from the manufacturer.' Upholding Bristol-Meyers' right of contribution, the court of civil appeals stated that the manufacturer had breached
a duty only to the user of the drug and not to the prescribing physician.,
The court reasoned that the sole duty owed by a drug manufacturer to a
physician is to communicate the danger of using a given medication' 6 and
119. Id. at 552. In Borg Warner Corp. v. White Motor Co., 344 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir.
1965) (applying Texas law), the failure to provide proper specifications was a major factor in
holding the defendants equally responsible. The court in Richards Manufacturing Co. v.
Aspromonte, 557 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, no writ), distinguished its holding from the result in Borg Warner by pointing out that there was no jury
finding that the retailer's failure in Aspromonte to provide proper specifications was a
proximate cause of the injury.
120. 548 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
121. Id. at 423, 427.
122. Id.at 421.
123. Id. at 421. When the nonsettling tortfeasor establishes a right to contribution, the
judgment will be reduced according to the applicable contribution statute. If the nonsettling
tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity, the law is unclear whether the court may place that burden
on the settlor, limit the plaintiffs recovery to the settlement or deny the nonsettling defendant any claim to indemnity. See generally Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor
Controversies-TexasLaw, 10 ST. MAv's L.J. 75, 79-87 (1978).
124. Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
125. Id. at 428.
126. Id. at 428. In some states, a drug manufacturer's duty to the prescribing physician
is greater than merely warning of a drug's potential danger. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law). In Hoffman the facts were
remarkably similar to those in Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales. Evidence disclosed that the
prescribing physician was aware of the dangerous side effects of the drug, but did not know
of the debilitating effects of prolonged use of the drug. The court held that the drug manufacturer had breached a duty to the physician. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132,
142 (3d Cir. 1973). The Texas Supreme Court did not address contribution and indemnity
in Bristol-Meyers. See Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1978).
See generally Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 868-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
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as neither tortfeasor had breached a duty to the other, the parties were in
pari delicto and the pro rata contribution statute determined the allocation of liability. 2 '
The Fifth Circuit in Vergott v. Deseret PharamaceuticalCo. 2 faced the
problem of applying Texas law, to the allocation of loss between a needle
manufacturer, a packager and distributor of the needle, and a hospital for
injuries sustained when a defective needle caused a catheter to break off
in a patient's vein.' Noting a jury finding that the needle was not fit for
its intended use and that this was the proximate cause of the injuries, the
court stated that the manufacturer had thereby breached a duty to the
distributor, the hospital, and the patient. 30 The manufacturer's claim for
indemnity was refused as the distributor and the hospital had not breached
any duty to the manufacturer, and would have been entitled to indemnification at common law had judgment been rendered against them.,
As is clearly evident in Vergott, application of Texas indemnity principles achieves equitable results when duties and responsibilities are clearcut. 3' It could hardly be argued under any theory of loss allocation that
an innocent retailer held strictly liable to a consumer should be required
to indemnify the producer of a dangerous instrumentality.' Unfortunately, when the relative duties become more complex and each tortfeasor
has contributed in some manner to the plaintiff's injury, application of the
Texas indemnity doctrine becomes difficult and frequently results in a
disproportionate allocation of the loss.'"' In both Richards Manufacturing
Co. and Bristol-Meyers, the conduct of each of the joined defendants was
'determined to be a proximate cause of the ultimate user's injury."' In
Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing duty owed by drug manufacturer to doctor);
Comment, The DiminishingRole of Negligence in Manufacturer'sLiability for Unavoidably
Unsafe Drugs and Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 102, 106-07 (1977).
127. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
128. 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972).
129. Under Texas law, hospital suppliers and hospitals are not subject to strict liability
under § 402A as they are not sellers engaged in the business of selling a product. Vergott v.
Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1972). Any indemnity action by a
manufacturer would have to be predicated on negligent conduct injuring both the plaintiff
and the manufacturer. See id. at 16. See also Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427
S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying strict tort liability
to distributors of medical products).
130. Vergott v. Deseret Pharamaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1972).
131. See id. at 16.
132. See id. at 16. But see Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors:A Proposed
Rationale, 37 IowA L.J. 517, 545 (1952) (concluding that Texas' indemnity formula has not
brought any certainty to Texas law).
133. See notes 78, 96-97, 106 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. Rv.
728, 739-41 (1968).

135. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 427, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978); Richards Mfg. Co. v.
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Richards Manufacturing Co. a retailer completely escaped liability for an
injury caused in part by its failure to include proper warnings.' 3 This result
contrasts sharply with the holding in Bristol-Meyers in which the manufacturer was able to show a right to contribution and the physician was
denied indemnity despite having acted in a reasonable manner by justifiably relying on the manufacturer's defective instructions.'31
As liability in each case was determined by the presence or absence of a
duty between the tortfeasors, the allocation of liability had no relation to
each party's role in the causation of the injury to the plaintiff.'", This result
contrasts sharply with the equitable nature of the comparative causation
system. Under that system even though a retailer who was adjudged

slightly negligent may have a technical right to common law indemnifica-

tion, he will still incur liability in direct proportion to his responsibility for
the injury to the consumer. 3 '
Manufacturer v.Manufacturer
The bulk of the cases in this area involve a claim by a manufacturer/assembler seeking indemnity from the manufacturer of a defective
component part. The manufacturer/assembler who. integrated a defective
component into his product is held strictly liable for the introduction of a
dangerous instrumentality into the stream of commerce."10 Only when the
evidence clearly establishes that the unsuitable part was the sole cause of
the injury will the assembler receive indemnity.'' Since the social purpose
Aspromonte, 557 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston lat Dist.] 1977, no writ).
136. Richards Mfg. Co. v. Aspromonte, 557 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. Civ. App,-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
137. See Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 427, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 80i (Tex. 1978).
138. The assessment of liability without any real relation to culpability also occurs when
the imprecise distinctions of the active-passive test are used. See Bjorklund v. Hantz, 208
N.W.2d 722, 723 (Minn. 1973) (thirty percent negligent retailer awarded indemnity from
manufacturer forty-five percent negligent). When Minnesota adopted a comparative fault
system of loss distribution Bjorklund was overruled as its reasoning allowed tortfeasors to
escape liability. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977).
139. Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962) was the first case to assess liability
by determining the percentage of causal negligence contributing to the injury.
It is difficult to justify, either on a layman's sense of justice or on a natural justice,
why a joint tortfeasor who is 5% causally negligent should only recover 50% of the
amount he paid to the plaintiff from a co-tortfeasor who is 95% causally negligent, and
conversely why the defendant who is found 5% causally negligent should be required
to pay 50% of the loss by way of reimbursement to the co-tortfeasor who is 95%
negligent.
Id. at 109.
140. Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 115 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Texas
law); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Texas law). See
also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op ToaRs § 402A, Comment q (1965).
141. See, e.g.,
Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 990 (10th Cir.
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of strict liability is to assure that the one actually responsible for placing
a dangerous product on the market is held liable, public policy is not
contravened by the shifting of the loss from the innocent manufacturer/assembler to the component manufacturer."' Thus, if the liability of
a manufacturer/assembler is predicated solely on the failure to inspect and
discover a malfunction in the component, the partmaker will suffer the
entire judgment."' The failure to discover a defect in a component as a
defense to indemnity liability has been extended in one jurisdiction in
which it was held that a manufacturer/assembler who negligently tested a
part and failed to uncover the malfunction was entitled to receive indemnity from the producer of the part."'
Problems with proof of proximate causation are particularly difficult
when a component has been fully integrated into a product. As a result,
the manufacturer/assembler and the component manufacturer will usually
be deemed to be in pari delicto and indemnity will rarely be awarded." '
In an instance in which a manufacturer/assembler failed to provide proper
specifications and to determine the suitability of a clutch in a truck, and
the clutch plate manufacturer failed to inspect it or to determine its suitability, the parties were held to be in pari delicto and the contribution
statute established loss allocation."' Similar results were reached when a
component producer was held strictly liable and the manufacturer/assembler was aware of the danger but failed to warn users." 7 The
Texas rationale for these holdings is that each party was guilty of wrongful
1975); B.K. Sweeney Co. v. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co., 489 P.2d 356, 358 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
City of Franklin v. Badger Food Truck Sales, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 866, 870-72 (Wis. 1973).
142. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 338 N.E.2d 857, 861 (Il.
1975) (liability should be traced back to originally responsible party). See also 3A L. FRUMER
& M. FREIDMAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY Indemnity § 44.02 [31[e], at 15-35 (1977); Michael &
Appel, Contributionand Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Need for Reform,
7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 591, 602 (1976).
143. See, e.g., Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Mo. 1975);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 723, 726 (E.D. Mich. 1970);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ill. 1975);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 93(1) (1937). But see Symons v. Mueller Co., 526 F.2d 13, 17

(10th Cir. 1975) (manufacturer/assembler who negligently failed to notice defective valve
indemnified partmaker); Reefer Queen Co. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 440 P.2d 453, 457
(Wash. 1968) (manufacturer/assembler who should have been aware of unsuitability of component liable for indemnity).
144. Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1967).
145. See Penn. v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So. 2d 210, 235 (La. Ct. of App. 1967) (gauge
manufacturer in pari delicto with glass supplier); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d
20, 25 (Wash. 1975) (dealer who negligently repaired not entitled to indemnity from maker
of defective piston rod cap).
146. Borg Warner Corp. v. White Motor, Co., 344 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying
Texas law).
147. Trahan v. Crosby-Laughlin, 460 F.2d 266, 267 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Texas law).
See also United Tractor Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 563 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1978, no writ) (both aware of defective condition).
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conduct that concurred in the injury to the plaintiff and since that same
conduct was a breach of each tortfeasor's duty to the other, no basis for
indemnity existed as neither party was blameless with respect to the
other.'48
Although there is very little Texas law concerning loss distribution between a component manufacturer and a manufacturer/assembler, it is
clear that this area will be plagued by the same problems with the strained
concepts of duty and inequitable results that affected common law indemnity when applied to retailers and employer/purchasers."I Due to the
difficulties with proof of proximate cause when a component is completely
integrated into the manufacturer's product, the relative duties and liabilities are blurred even further when considered in the context of the Texas
test for indemnity.
Other Situations
Frequently, a purchaser who does not fall in the class of employer, retailer, or manufacturer will injure another through the operation of a defective instrumentality. When the owner of an automobile injures another
due to a mechanical defect in the vehicle and is held liable on the basis
of a nondelegable duty, the owner will generally be reimbursed by the
manufacturer.1" Operation of the car with knowledge of the mechanical
malfunction, however, will usually place the parties in pari delicto and bar

claims for indemnity. 151

Recent Texas authority indicates that a manufacturer's right to recover
against a concurrently negligent consumer will also be determined by the
existence and breach of respective duties. In Heil Co. v. Grant12 the widow
and children of the decedent, who was killed when the bed of his brother's
dump truck descended as he was working under it, instituted a strict
liability action against the manufacturer for defective design and for failure to warn of the hazard."53 Alleging that the decedent's brother was
negligent in allowing him to work beneath the raised bed without a brace,
148. Borg Warner Corp. v. White Motor Co., 344 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977).
149. See notes 71-76, 89-91, 132-37 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Allied Mut. Cas. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455, 458-59 (10th Cir.
1960) (applying Missouri law); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 188-89 (I11.1965);
Ford v. Flaherty, 294 N.E.2d 437, 439-40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1972); RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTON
§ 93(1), Comment a, Illustration 2 (1937).
151. See Schneider v. Swaney Motor Car Co., 136 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa 1965); Lenhart
v. Owens, 507 P.2d 318, 323 (Kan. 1973). But see Bill Loeper Ford v. Hites, 121 Cal. Rptr.
131, 136 (Ct. App. 1975) (strictly liable dealer not entitled to recovery over against negligent
driver). A substantial alteration of the vehicle may also bar any recovery by the owner against
the manufacturer. See Douglas Equip., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 471 F.2d 222, 225 (7th Cir.
1972) (recovery disallowed when exploding truck air reservoir tank had been significantly
changed by employer of injured employee).
152. 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
153. Id. at 919-20.
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the manufacturer sought contribution or indemnity by impleading the
brother. The Tyler Court of Civil Appeals applied the Texas indemnity
test' 4 and refused the manufacturer's claim.'55 Instead, the brother as a
consumer was held entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer as Heil
had breached its duty to furnish a truck without dangerous defects.' 6 Even
if the brother's negligence had been established, such a finding would
likely have been found irrelevant to any claim by the manufacturer as his
duty ran to the decedent, not to the manufacturer.'57
A strictly liable defendant's right to indemnity from a negligent joint
tortfeasor was further analyzed in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons.'5
Examining the criteria used by other states, the Texas Supreme Court
stated that ignorance of a latent defect not reasonably discoverable, actual
knowledge of a defect, or independent harm caused by a cotortfeasor's
conduct were factors influencing indemnity awards.' 9 Simmons represented an attempt by the Texas Supreme Court to clarify the duties and
responsibilities of joint tortfeasors in indemnity and contribution actions
founded on strict liability. "' Simmons recognized, however, that the proper method for insuring equitable distribution of losses in products liability
cases in Texas was uncertain, and asked for legislative assistance in remedying the problem.''
154. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
155. Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
156. Id. at 926-27. See also Comment, Contributionand Indemnity: Does the Right Exist
Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Is Liable on a Theory of Strict Liability, 18 S. TEx. L.J.
572, 578 (1977).
157. Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (on motion for rehearing); accord, William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc.,
348 A.2d 716, 718 (N.H. 1975); Olch v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 573 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1978). A party's status as a purchaser from a particular manufacturer does not create
a duty to the manufacturer beyond that owed as a member of the general public. See Heil
Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Petco
Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
158. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).'
159. Id. at 860-61. Simmons also clarified two other unsettled areas. It emphasized that
liability, direct or derivative, under § 402A extends only to physical injury to person or
property and not to economic loss. Id. at 860. See generally Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. Rav. 917 (1966); see also Nobility Homes v.
Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1977). In addition Simmons stressed that the general duty
owed by a manufacturer to a user will not be extended to all parties coming into contact with
the product to justify indemnity to a cotortfeasor under all circumstances. General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); accord, South Austin Drive-In Theatre
v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859-62 (Tex. 1977). See
generally Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-14 (1978).
161. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862-63 (Tex. 1977).
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COMMENTS
CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the present Texas system for the allocation of
losses between joint tortfeasors in a strict liability action frequently results
in the assessment of liability disproportionate to actual fault. 162 The value
of an indemnity test that is based entirely upon the duties between tortfeasors and ignores actual responsibility for the injury is highly questionable.' The inadequacy of the system is especially evident when the rigidly structured, all-or-nothing Texas test is contrasted with loss distribution systems that no longer use the common law indemnity concept and
determine liability on the basis of comparative causation. " , The Texas
Supreme Court has invited legislative clarification of the rights and remedies between negligent and strictly liable tortfeasors. In the interest of
common sense and justice, the Texas Legislature should discard the artificial concepts of common law indemnity and institute a system of loss
distribution that assesses liability entirely on the basis of actual culpability.
162. See text accompanying notes 73-76, 87-90, 130-34 supra.
163. See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1978) (ideas
founded on negligence theory not satisfactorily transferred to strict liability situations). See
also Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ill. 1978) (ordinary negligence and indemnity theories not adaptable to strict liability).
164. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 901, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 184 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 39192 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1962).
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